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General Services Administration is faced with the
responsibility of improving its physical distribution capabilities
by either upgrading its current facilities or constructing a new
facility. A cost /benefit analysis was conducted of all viable
alternatives as to the least future cost to the government while
maintaining General Services Administration' s current level of
service and effectiveness. Of the alternatives analyzed, it was
determined that it would be of the utmost benefit to the government
for General Services Administration' s Western Distribution Center
to relocate at Sharpe Army Depot, current site of a portion of
Defense Logistics Agencies Western Distribution Center. At Sharpe,
General Services Administration has the greatest potential for cost
savings while improving its warehousing ability well into the next
century. Additionally, there are many potential benefits not
addressed, such as consolidation of distribution functions between
General Services Administration and Defense Logistics Agency, in
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The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently experiencing
a severe downward trend in overall funding, and may see a
decrease of as much as 40% in the next three years if some
members of the U.S. Congress are successful in their re-
programming efforts.
The current decrease in defense spending is attributable
to the change in the world political order. The apparent
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
and our improved stature politically in the Middle East, have
all contributed to the increasing pressure to decrease defense
spending. These far reaching changes have resulted in a 25%
decrease in defense department budget authority over the last
two years with more cuts expected. These cuts may run even
deeper than expected due to intense lobbying efforts by
special interest groups, and Congressman that desire even
deeper cuts in defense spending. The goal of the
aforementioned people is to glean and spend the so called
"peace dividend" and divert spending from defense programs to
domestic programs. The overall result of decreased spending
is that the armed forces must change the way they do
business. The armed forces must immediately review current
programs and business practices in order to find the means
necessary to maintain cost effectiveness and improve
efficiency, while having fewer and fewer resources available.
These changes must be accomplished while DOD is being
required to maintain the operational tempo that was in place
before the end of the cold war. Additionally, support
activities are being pressured to continue to maintain the
present level of service.
The combination of world events and deficit spending by
Congress and the President have already led to many new cost-
cutting and productivity improvement initiatives on the part
of the federal government, some of which are the results of a
study called the "Defense Management Review (DMR) . " The
federal supply agencies and armed forces are now in the
process of instituting some of these initiatives, such as
consolidation of supply activities, unit costing of resource
activities, and the introduction of the Defense Business
Operating Fund (DBOF)
.
In this operating environment of austerity and budget
cuts, the sharing of limited resources between federal
agencies may soon become a necessity. This coordination and
consolidation of services can be married to the Department of
Defense's efforts to improve the overall processes within its
agencies. No longer is the federal government going to be
allowed to spend without concerning itself with tying budget
restrictions to the level and cost of services it must
provide. Service activities within the federal government,
such as supply activities, must concern themselves with
matching revenues to cost of operations. If an activity
cannot justify its existence, and ensure that its costs are
covered by the services it provides, then it will probably be
forced to close down and the service discontinued.
A . BACKGROUND
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is a world-wide federal
services support organization that manages approximately 4.949
million line items, including food, spare parts, and other
miscellaneous supplies. DLA actually has cognizance over
almost 64% of the federal government's 4.8 million national
stock numbered (NSN) line items that are used to support
military services wherever they are stationed. [Ref 1]
General Services Administration (GSA) is also a world wide
organization which provides US government activities with
administrative services, such as building maintenance, and
expertise in the area of supply support operations (under the
guise of the Federal Supply Service)
.
Defense Distribution Region West (DDRW) was created as a
result of the Packard commission's study in 1985. These
findings were presented to congress under the title "Defense
Management Review (DMR) " and congress tasked the Department of
Defense with implementing these DMR results. The secretary of
Defense prepared and implemented Defense Management Review
Directives, four of which led to the creation of DDRW under
DLA. In addition, a Distribution region East and Central was
established. (Exhibit A)
DDRW is composed of all DOD distribution centers in the
greater San Francisco Bay area and currently has excess land
and under-utilized facilities available for other uses. These
facilities have become available due to internal efforts to
reorganize and consolidate distribution activities, as well as
Congressional mandated restructuring and reorganization.
As discussed earlier, consolidations between government
agencies may become much more common in the future as the need
to conserve limited resources increases and funding of federal
activities decreases. The main issue to be examined in the
context of this document is, where should GSA locate its
Western Distribution Center? Should GSA enter into a joint-
tenant arrangement with another agency (such as DDRW) , or
should GSA remain at Rough and Ready Island? These issues
can best be addressed by conducting a cost/benefit analysis of
the most realistic options open to both parties. GSA has
basically three options open for evaluation: (1) remain at
Rough and Ready Island (2) pursue a joint-tenant relationship
with DLA at Sharpe Army Depot in California, and (3)
purchase/lease facilities on the commercial market.
Currently, DLA is considering just such a joint-tenant
proposal and is open to providing the necessary land and
support facilities to GSA, but only if such an arrangement
would also be beneficial to the continued existence of the DLA
facility at Sharp Army Depot. The proposed tenant agreement
would provide many benefits to both GSA and DLA. Two of the
most important benefits are that (1) such an agreement would
provide mutual benefits in the area of cost reduction by the
utilization of common resources, and (2) such an agreement
would solidify the importance of maintaining the Sharp Army
Depot and the GSA Western Distribution Center as active
operating facilities within the Government. This would make
them less prone to being included on base closure lists.
B . OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this thesis is to determine what
course of action GSA should pursue in the organization and
location of its warehouse operation. This involves a
cost/benefit analysis of the alternatives available to GSA and
comparisons of each. Additionally, this paper will attempt to
determine if it would be beneficial for DDRW to provide GSA
with the land and facilities requirements as proposed, or
maintain the undeveloped areas in their present state. The
cost/benefit analysis will be used to determine if such an
arrangement would be cost effective, if it would in fact
reduce operating costs at Sharp, and/or reduce transportation
costs associated by combining separate and distinct
distribution networks.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question is, if GSA should relocate,
whether or not the co-location of GSA and Sharp Army Depot
would be beneficial from a cost/benefit standpoint- Secondly,
what type(s) of agreement between the two agencies would be
required to support such an arrangement, and, lastly, what
services and at what costs would each of the parties be
required to provide?
As a third concern, what degree of consolidation of
physical distribution aspects could result from such an
agreement? Many of the customers served by both activities
are one in the same. Consolidating less-than-truckload (LTL)
and overseas shipments would greatly drive down much of the
distribution costs associated with these two modes of
shipment. Additional concerns are, would the level of service
provided by DDRW be in keeping with GSA' s level of service
and will the measures of effectiveness employed by GSA be in
congruence with those of DDRW?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1 . SCOPE
In this study, the benefits as a function of cost were
focused on as the basis for our recommendations. There are
many non-quantifiable variables that were not taken into
account, unless we were able to determine a way in which to
quantify them using existing conventions.
Since the analysis is to determine if it would be
beneficial for DDRW to provide facilities to GSA, and the
potential for consolidation of some distribution functions, we
did not take on the larger research question of consolidation
of GSA and DLA as a whole. In our opinion this would be a
political question rather than a research question because no
matter what the outcome of such a study, it would still
require a political decision.
2 . LIMITATION
The primary limitation involved is the budgeting limits
associated with such an endeavor. Even though it may be more
beneficial to relocate GSA and save money in the long run for
both GSA and DLA, there may not be funding provided to GSA to
effect such a relocation prior to 1998 due to budgetary
constraints. In other words, even though it may be a good
idea from a fiscal standpoint, such a move may not occur for
a long period of time.
A secondary limitation of this study is the lack of
empirical cost data affecting GSA' s alternatives. Since this
project in purely in the formative stage, much of the cost
data has not been determined, or obtained from outside
sources. Much of the detailed cost information would only be
forth coming as the project takes shape and substance sometime
in the future.
3. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
In order to facilitate the discussion of the research
questions raised, this study was broken down to five
independent sections that follow in chapter format.
Chapter one is an introduction to the research project
and discusses research questions, limitations, scope, and
general background information of the affected organizations.
Chapter two is a discussion of the background and history
of GSA, DLA, WDC, and DDRW. Additionally, the requirements
for GSA' s facility will be presented, discussed, and listed as
Exhibit C.
Chapter three is a detailed discussion of each of the
alternatives facing GSA in regards to GSA' s selection of a
site for their Western Distribution Center.
Chapter four will be a discussion of problems and
concerns associated with each alternative. Additionally, this
chapter will focus upon problems encountered from the previous
chapters and with data provided by the research effort.
Chapter five will include our recommendations and general
comments in regard to the decision to be made and the entire
research process.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
In order to facilitate and organize a logical discussion
of the four organizations affected by this research paper,
General Services Administration (GSA) , Western Distribution
Center (WDC) , Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) , and Defense
Distribution Region West (DDRW) , an understanding of each of
their backgrounds and histories is crucial.
This chapter will discuss each organization independently
and also their relationships to each other within the federal
government's large bureaucracy.
A. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Created in 194 9 as a result of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act, GSA is a worldwide organization
which includes the Federal Supply System. It is responsible
for contracting, physical distribution, and facilities
maintenance of government land and buildings. [Ref 2] More
specifically, GSA is chartered to provide "an economical and
efficient system for:
a. the procurement and supply of personal property
and non-personal services,
b. the utilization of available property,
c. the disposal of surplus property, and
d. records management." [Ref 3]
As currently organized, GSA is centered on four separate
business functions. These functions are as follows:
1. Public Buildings Services (PBS) - manages the
government's civilian real estate portfolio, having the full
range of responsibilities for facilities management service.
This includes acquisition, design, construction, and operation
and maintenance. PBS primarily receives its funding through
the Federal Building Fund.
2. Federal Supply Service (FSS) - manages the
policies and provisions governing personal property and non-
personal services to the Federal Government worldwide.
Included are supply services, fleet management, centralized
audit of transportation vouchers, and the management of excess
or surplus personal property. FSS receives its funding
through the Federal Supply Fund.
3. Information Resources Management Service (IRMS) -
provides government wide policy, direction, assistance, and
coordination for the acquisition, management, and use of
automated data processing (ADP) and telecommunications
equipment and services
.
4. Federal Property Resources Service (FPRS)
provides for further use by Federal agencies of excess
government real property, and the disposal of surplus real
property by transfer for specific public purposes or by
competitive sale to the public. [Ref 3]
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GSA serves all U.S. government operations on a global
level, has more than 10,000,000 customers annually, and ships
merchandise valued at approximately $1 billion each year. Of
this total annual business, approximately 70% is with the
defense department
.
[Re f 2] GSA, through its Federal Supply
System, maintains its own distribution system which carries
out the functions of requisitioning, receiving, shipping,
inventory control, contracting, etc. [Ref 4]
GSA, like DOD, currently finds itself operating in an
increasingly changing environment in the federal government.
A major environmental change is in the area of competition.
Legislative changes requiring full cost recovery in our stock
centers afford GSA' s clients latitude in choosing the source
of supply that meets their requirements of quality and cost.
In 1990 alone, over 95% of GSA' s funding was through the sale
of services to other government agencies. This will grow if
GSA is able to manage in a competitive manner, meeting their
clients needs while controlling costs. [Ref 3]
Originally, GSA had six full service distribution depots
located across the United States, but recently these were
consolidated into four regional headquarters. Two full
service depots located at Chicago, IL, and Franconia, VA, were
closed with the functions being absorbed by the depots located
at sites in New Jersey, Texas, Georgia, and California. This
reorganization allowed GSA to establish four major inventory
service depots in order to provide interaction with its
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customers and perform physical distribution functions. [Ref 2]
GSA' s Western Distribution Center was established as part of
the above reorganization in 1986. [Ref 5]
General Services Administration's Western Distribution
Center is presently located at Navy Communications Center,
Rough and Ready Island. The center is in need of new
facilities due to its increased mission under the above
reorganization, the lack of modern warehousing equipment, the
deterioration of its leased facilities, and serious
limitations with the current joint-tenant agreement with the
Navy. A new, more modern facility is required in the Western
area in order for FSS to support this reorganization and the
expected increase in throughput of material and requisitions
due to the closure of two of GSA'' s distribution sites. [Ref 4]
Even with the downsizing of the military, it is not expected
to decrease GSA' s business appreciably due to the nature of
the items the military buys from GSA. This is significant
because, as previously stated, approximately 70% of the
Western Distribution Centers business comes from Defense
Department activities.
Rough and Ready Island was originally, and still is,
operated and maintained by the Department of the Navy. The
island includes 47 warehouses, 17 of which are used by GSA.
GSA occupies 1,434,468 square feet of storage space at an
average storage height of 12.0 ft and another 619,437 square
feet for operational functions; i.e., packing, shipping,
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material handling equipment (MHE) , bin storage, material
returns, etc. [Ref 5] The use of these facilities is provided
for under a tenant-lease agreement with the Navy. This
agreement grants GSA, through the PBS, a license to use the
buildings. The warehouses and base infrastructure were all
constructed during and immediately following World War II, and
later became one of GSA' s western supply depots being managed
by the FSS. It wasn't until the reorganization of the service
depots in 198 6 that the FSS established the Western
Distribution Center and began operations as Region 9 in San
Francisco. [Exhibit B]
GSA' s strategic plan for the Western Distribution Center
is to: 1) receive, store, and ship common-use supply items for
wholesale and retail support of government agencies, and 2)
process common-use supply items and non-stores items for
export shipment in support of US military, civilian, foreign
military sales (FMS) , and AID customer agencies. [Ref 5]
In addition to WDC, Rough and Ready Island is host to
numerous other tenants, such as the Defense Disposal Agency,
the Directorate of Industrial Plant Equipment, the US Army
Defense and Readiness Command Watercraft Storage, the US Navy
Sea Systems Command Ships Salvage Material, and the Department
of Justice's Border Patrol.
Under the current tenant-lease agreement, the Navy
maintains the physical condition of the structures and
provides for mutually agreed upon improvements. Currently,
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the physical structures are in need of repair and improvement,
but the Navy appears unwilling to undertake any such actions.
[Ref 6] This lack of improvements or repairs is due to severe
funding constraints, as well as apparent lack of interest on
the Navy's part to provide benefits to an outside
organization. The other activities utilizing warehouse space
at Rough and Ready are not as dependent as GSA is upon having
modern warehousing equipment. These tenants simply require
large tracts of roofed storage. The Navy's lack of
improvements and concern for its tenants do not impact these
tenants as it does GSA, which is in the business of inventory
management and physical distribution.
GSA' s present location at Rough and Ready Island has been
successful, as evidenced by WDC's effectiveness rate of 99.4%
on sales of 253.9 million issues in 1990. [Ref 5] This will
become more tenuous in the future as facilities continue to
deteriorate with little funding provided for necessary
improvements. Also, GSA is unwilling to fund these
improvements as it would be upgrading Navy assets. [Ref 6]
Even if improvements were made to the facilities, these
improvements may not increase FSS efficiency due to problems
of inadequate water pressure for fire suppression equipment
required to support the incorporation of new warehousing
technology. This is the very technology necessary to allow a
reduction in the current labor intensive operation of storage
and retrieval. Additionally, there would remain only one
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access road on and off the island, no rail service, no
airfield nearby, and no shipping ports able to handle
containerized cargo.
GSA' s position is that if the Western Distribution Center
is to remain a viable entity and continue to support its
customers in a timely and efficient manner into the next
century, then it must be improved now. GSA has developed
minimum requirements that must be met if they are to move













For more in-depth and space specific information, Exhibit C
provides the exact requirements that GSA wishes to incorporate
into a new, modern warehouse and distribution center for its
West Coast operation. The composite specifications used in
this study are 2 million square feet of space. This composite
is broken down into 25,000 square feet of office space, 1.34
million square feet of warehouse space, and 441,000 square
15
feet of laydown space. Additionally, GSA considers 100 acres
of useable land to be the minimum amount necessary to meet all
of its requirements.
These categories were chosen as headings for the
requirements because they loosely follow the budget categories
GSA will be concerned with when they POM this project. These
are some of the budget categories that will affect GSA in its
future decisions regarding the Western Distribution Center.
The requirements were also broken down into these categories
due to the numerous echelons of bureaucracy that will be
involved in the final decision process. For example, in order
for GSA to continue with the planning of this project, all of
GSA' s functional divisions must get involved in the various
aspects of the project, including their respective areas of
funding. These categories affect different government
activities and the requirements can be pursued independently
from each other.
B. DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Created in 1962, DLA' s mission was to remove from the
services the responsibility for wholesale supply management of
those consumable items (e.g., office supplies, paint, cleaning
supplies, etc.) that were being managed by the General
Services Administration. GSA was given the responsibility to
procure these items for DOD, and over the years since 1962,
presently manages about 7% of the nearly 5 million line items
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required and stocked by DLA. The military has to "buy" these
items from GSA and depend on GSA to properly manage the
inventories. DLA was tasked with ensuring GSA compliance with
DOD guidelines in the management and stocking levels of these
inventories. The importance of DLA in the defense logistics
system has grown immensely over the last twenty years as DLA
has become the largest supplier of material to government
agencies, especially to the four armed services. DLA has taken
over inventory responsibility for common use items of all four
services, such as food, clothing, electrical components,
certain electronics, etc. The importance of DLA' s management
of selected items is that it was created in an attempt to
consolidate supply functions in order to save defense dollars.
[Ref 7]
DLA also assumed responsibility for managing those
consumable items which were peculiar to the military, but were
used by more than one service. In 1962, DLA managed
approximately 10% of the total military requirements.
Currently, DLA is responsible for about 62% of the total items
used by the military. [Ref 7]
C. DEFENSE DISTRIBUTION REGION WEST
In July 1990, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, as
part of a Defense Management Review Directive, established the
Defense Distribution regions. DDRW is the prototype for the
other two distribution regions which are to located in the
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east and in the central portion of the country. Exhibit A
shows the proposed location for these Distribution regions.
Defense Distribution Region West (DDRW) was established at
Tracy, CA, and encompassed the greater San Francisco Bay area.
In July 1990, DDRW was founded and included Defense Depot
Tracy, Sharpe Army Depot (also known as the San Joaguin Site)
,
and Navy Supply Center (NSC) Oakland distribution functions.
DDRW was founded in order to reduce costs of supply
operations and physical distribution systems by taking
advantage of consolidation of redundant services being
performed by DOD activities in the West. DDRW had its direct
roots in the Defense Management Reviews (DMR) . DLA
established DDRW in an attempt to adhere to the tenets of DMR
901 "Reduction of Supply System Costs", DMR 902 "Combine
Supply Depots", DMR 915 "Reduction of Transportation Costs",
and DMR 926 "Consolidation of Inventory Control Points (ICP) ."
[Ref 7] The effectiveness of this reorganization is yet to be
determined.
In April 1991 Colonel Creel, then Commanding Officer of
DDRW, was interested in determining if it would be of mutual
benefit for DDRW to provide another federal agency with some
of their excess capacity in order to share resources and
reduce costs. [Ref 8] A large 100 acre tract of land was
identified at Sharpe Army Depot. The support facilities
located at Sharp were confirmed to have excess capacity due to
the Defense Department's consolidation of its distribution
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facilities to Defense Depot Tracy, CA. If the Defense
department continues its down sizing efforts, excess capacity
at Sharpe Army Depot will probably increase. Thus, it will be
even more beneficial for DDRW to have other warehousing
activities co-located at the depot in order to help prevent
congressional base closing panels from evaluating Sharpe as a
possible base closure candidate.
At this juncture in time, General Service Administration
and Defense Logistics Agency are undergoing extreme changes in
the way they operate and conduct business. They are under
pressure to operate in a more business like fashion by tying
revenues to expenses and still maintaining their
competitiveness
.
In the next chapter we will address some realistic options




III. ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
The first part of this chapter is an in-depth review of
the GSA alternatives currently being considered. These
alternatives are:
1. Remain at Rough and Ready Island, and
a. Improve facilities or
b. Maintain status-quo,
2. Lease warehouse, office, and laydown space from
commercial sources, or
3. Build a new facility on government land.
The second part of this chapter will review anticipated cost
areas, concerns, possible operational impacts, advantages, and
disadvantages DLA may face in the event an agreement is
reached and construction of a GSA facility at Sharpe is
approved.
A. REMAIN ON ROUGH AND READY ISLAND
The first option under this alternative would be to remain
at Rough and Ready Island and improve the facilities.
Currently, GSA is paying approximately $5 million dollars a
year to the Department of the Navy under an annually renewable
joint-tenant/lease agreement. The costs cover utilities,
certain warehouse and facility maintenance, security, and fire
20
protection. GSA is using approximately 2 million square feet
and the annual costs work out to be about $285 per square
foot. Although staying at Rough and Ready Island is a viable
option, it is not a cost efficient option because of the
following reasons:
a. The warehouses are in poor material condition and are
beyond economical repair or improvement. GSA estimates the
cost to repair/upgrade the warehouses to a condition suitable
for modern warehouse equipment and technology to be
approximately $5 million dollars. Additionally, even if the
funds were made available for the repair and upgrading of the
buildings themselves, it is still questionable as to whether
modern warehouse equipment could be installed for maximum
efficiency. The overall dimensions of the current structures
may not be suitable, or may not lend themselves to current
warehouse technology. Additionally, floor load strength may
not be strong enough to support modern warehouse equipment,
let alone the additional weight of the items stored within.
The interior building height may not be suitable for high rise
storage and the requisite fire suppression equipment.
b. The base infrastructure of utilities, fire
suppression/repression equipment, water-mains, and road
systems are inadequate to support increased operations or the
needs of a modern warehouse facility. The current
infrastructure is essentially 1940' s and 1950' s technology,
and as such is totally inadequate to support modern warehouse
21
equipment and technology. According to GSA, the entire
electric and fire water-main systems would have to be
completely replaced in order to meet current technological
needs, specifications, and fire protection standards. This
cost, although not estimated by GSA studies, would probably be
more expensive than building/installing new such systems due
to the cost of disconnecting, removing, and disposing of the
old systems.
c. The tenant relationship that currently exists between
the Navy and GSA allows very little flexibility for warehouse
improvements (i.e., expanding storage capability and upgrading
fire protection systems) that GSA might wish to incorporate.
Under the current agreement, the Navy does periodic
inspections of the warehouses and can dictate to GSA maximum
storage heights, minimum aisle widths, and determinations as
to what items are "hazardous". Thus, non-warehouse personnel
are dictating to GSA how to operate and organize its own
warehouses! Obviously, this is not the way GSA wants to do
business and this type of interference often leads to hard
feelings between all parties concerned, not to mention
inefficient storage and less than optimum warehouse
management
.
d. There is no working railroad transportation system
currently available at Rough and Ready Island. It would cost
GSA an estimated $500,000 (Navy contract quotes) to build a
new railroad trestle bridge. This does not include reworking
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the tracks and switching stations leading to the trestle and
those on the island. Although the current primary mode of
transportation is by truck, efficient and convenient access to
rail transportation is highly desirable from GSA' s point of
view. This is desirable because it would allow GSA to take
advantage of any future decrease in rail transportation
charges, as well as open another avenue for shipping stocked
items in times of national emergencies or warfare.
e. The current and foreseeable future does not allow GSA
to take advantage of cost efficiency savings from modern
technology and equipment due to the obsolete base
infrastructure. In light of the current fiscal environment
faced by all of DOD, and as funds become more scarce and
pressure increases to perform better than in the past with
less funding, GSA must find ways to increase efficiency of
operations. Although it is possible some cost savings can be
made within the current warehouse framework, it is even more
probable that much greater savings would be realized with the
use of modern warehouse equipment, technology, and
methodology.
f. Budget cuts within DOD are resulting in even less
building and base maintenance by the Navy, and such costs are
being forced upon GSA if building and base maintenance are to
be accomplished. Yet, GSA is reluctant to put scarce
maintenance dollars into buildings owned by another department
of the government, especially when such improvements can only
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be made with prior approval by that other department. In this
case, that other department is the Navy.
g. There is only one access road on and off the island
which severely limits traffic flow of both truck and passenger
vehicles. Although another bridge could possibly be built,
this could only occur after obtaining construction funding, a
positive environmental impact report, and approval by the
local government. Then, the same type of problems would be
faced in trying to expand the current road system. As for the
cost of these improvements, they have not yet been estimated.
The second option under this alternative is to remain at
Rough and Ready Island and to maintain the status-quo. In the
current fiscal environment and in light of the increasing
demand for even more drastic cuts in the defense budget, the
conservative approach would be to continue operations from
Rough and Ready Island.
This approach has several merits. First, it would provide
additional time for GSA and Navy to obtain firm quotes for the
improvement of the warehouses and for testing of the floor
strengths of these warehouses. This is actually only a merit
if these two organizations were willing to fund the
improvements, which they are not. Secondly, it would allow
time to obtain estimates for modernizing the base
infrastructure
.
With regard to the lease agreement, the additional time
would allow for GSA and the Navy to continue negotiations as
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to the terms of the agreement and to continue to improve the
specific areas where either party is not satisfied.
Another merit to maintaining the status-quo is in the
area of rail transportation. The delay would allow GSA to
research the feasibility of increased transportation of goods
by rail and to estimate the cost savings that increased access
to railroad facilities would provide. These cost savings
could then be compared with cost estimates for the work needed
to restore rail transportation to Rough and Ready Island.
This comparison would allow GSA to construct payback tables,
a cost/benefit analysis, etc., in order to ascertain the
"value" of rail transportation to a distribution facility
located on the Island.
Finally, by delaying the decision of whether or not to
build a new facility, GSA will have the opportunity of
experiencing what the real demand and business needs of GSA'
s
western region are. This will provide information as to
exactly what equipment a new warehouse facility would require,
or even if a new facility would be necessary.
Although there are merits to maintaining the status-quo,
there are still the disadvantages explained in the previous
paragraphs, e.g., only one access road, poor material
condition of the warehouses and facilities, the current lease
agreement, and lack of modern warehouse equipment.
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B. LEASE FACILITIES
The second alternative is that of leasing warehouse,
office, and laydown space from commercial sources. The
current estimate is that GSA will need approximately 1.34
million square feet of warehouse space, 25,000 square feet of
office space, and 441,000 square foot of laydown area.
Current commercial rates in the San Francisco area range from
30 to 60 cents per square feet per month for warehouse space,
from 75 cents to $1.50 per square foot per month for office
space, and 12 to 13 cents per square foot per month for
laydown space. [Ref 9] For the purpose of comparison, the
current approximate composite rate for Rough and Ready Island
is $2.50 per square foot per year, or $.208 per square foot
per month.
Assuming that GSA could lease indefinitely at the
"average" rate for each of the different types of storage
space and that the storage locations could be rented in the
same geographical area for transportation purposes, then it
would cost GSA approximately:
Warehouse space (.45 x 1.34M) - $603,000 per month
Office space (1.125 x 25K) - $28,125
Laydown space (.12 x 441K) - $52,920




Using today's prices, for a twenty year lease it would cost
GSA approximately $164,170,800 to lease the space it needs now
and is expected to need in the future. It should be noted
here that according to Barbara Wilson, Project Manager, WDC,
there is currently not a single commercial site or group of
sites situated geographically in the San Francisco area that
would lend itself to this application. Additionally, modern
rack and material handling systems, would still have to
installed at these sites in order for this alternative to be
economically feasible. However, it should also be noted that
large tracts of land are currently being turned from
agriculture use into industrial, commercial, or housing uses.
Thus, it is inconceivable that a large, industrial, modern
warehouse complex might be available in the future. It is
also conceivable that a company might join with a local
government and agree to construct the warehouse complex GSA
desires, and then lease said complex to GSA under a long term
lease agreement. This has in fact been done at one GSA site
on the East coast; however, it has not been without problems.
As an example, problems have developed over site selection,
complex acceptance, construction discrepancies, material
handling equipment acceptance, and warranties. Although
leasing commercial space is a possible solution, GSA at this
time is not amenable to using this approach for its West Coast
facility due to the problems experienced at its leased
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facility on the East Coast and due, also, to the costs of such
an arrangement
.
C. BUILD A NEW FACILITY
The third alternative is for GSA to build a modern
warehouse facility on government owned land. This facility
would be almost identical to the facility that GSA is building
in Fort Worth, Texas- The budgeted cost for the Fort Worth
facility is $129,900,000. Applying 1.24% for the construction
index differential between Texas and California increases the
cost to $161,076,000. Now, allowing 4.2% for 1991 inflation
increases, the cost of a similar facility built on a
government site would be approximately $167,841,190.
Table 1 is a comparison of the above three options.
Although some of the cost data is not available since GSA has
not obtained quotes, the table clearly displays the major
factors of the three options discussed above. The table also
provides a breakdown of each option in per year dollars for
comparison purposes.
D. OTHER ALTERNATIVES
It should be noted that other alternatives are available,
such as buying commercial facilities, buying commercial land
and building a new facility, or requesting the Navy transfer
control and ownership of Rough and Ready Island to GSA.
However, each of these alternatives would by their very nature
28
be more expensive than the three detailed above, because GSA
would now be responsible for the maintenance of the sites
infrastructure, which as previously mentioned, is in need of
drastic improvement. These alternatives are not pursued in
depth at this time.
In order to buy a modern warehouse facility from a
commercial source, GSA would not only have to pay for the land
and the construction costs, but it would also have to pay an
additional 10 to 15 percent in the way of profits in order for
a company to undertake the contract.
For GSA to buy commercial land and build a new facility
thereon, it would obviously cost more than building on land
already owned by the government. Not only would the
government have to pay the market rate for the land, but it
would then have to build the entire base infrastructure.
Finally, for GSA to take title of Rough and Ready Island
would not solve the problems of an inadequate infrastructure,
obsolete buildings, and access restrictions.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY of GSA' S ALTERNATIVES
Remain at Rough and Ready Island:
- Lease per year
- Bldg repair/upgrade
- Repair trestle bridge
- Construct infrastructure








2 . Lease commercial space
- Lease per month
- Lease per year
- increase in warehousing operations










E. DLA ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
In the event that DLA and GSA enter into a joint-tenant
agreement at Sharpe Army Depot , and GSA constructs a modern
warehouse and distribution center at Sharpe, certain areas of
concern arise for DLA. Unfortunately, such concerns are
usually accompanied by unexpected, unbudgeted and
uncontrollable costs. The following is a list of some of
these DLA concerns and/or disadvantages:
a. Increased employee overtime due to disruption of daily
routines as a result of increased traffic on and around the
base as construction crews and material arrive and building
commences
.
b. Increase in security forces/overtime due to the need
to clear the additional traffic and provide increased access
both on and off the base.
c. Lost work hours as base infrastructure is expanded in
order to accommodate the new facilities (i.e., water and
electrical outages, closures for fire main improvements,
etc. )
.
d. Increased coordination will require additional
planning costs in order to provide optimum use of time,
facilities, and resources.
e. Morale may temporarily suffer as waiting lines develop
for base access, cafeteria, parking, dispensary, etc.
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The above items are difficult to quantify, however, once
construction contracts have been awarded, schedules
established, building plans and infrastructure designs
selected, and coordination begins between all concerned
parties, then some of these costs "fall out" and then they can
be quantified. Although it will be difficult to predict and
control the cost and impact areas that DLA may experience,
advance coordination will minimize their impact on personnel,
daily operations, and construction of the new facility.
Some of the advantages anticipated to be achieved by both
GSA and DLA should a joint-tenant agreement be reached, and
construction of a GSA warehouse and distribution center be
approved, are:




d. Rail Car Switching
e. Fuel (Gas Station)
f. Food Services
g. Hazardous Waste Disposal
h. Disposal of Excess Property
2. Personnel:
a. Use of same OPN personnel hire registers
b. Availability of emergency assistance from each other
c. Additional training opportunities
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d. Consolidation of some activities to result in need
for fewer personnel
3. Transportation:
a. Minimization of expenses associated with transfer of
material to the containerization and consolidation
point (CCP)
.
b. Better utilization through consolidation of export
vans
c. Ability to consolidate shipments to mutual customers,
thereby taking advantage of truckload rates.
d. Possibility of consolidating UPS shipments to
selected areas and shipping as truckload to UPS hubs
for local delivery.
e. Availability of on-site airfield for emergency
requisitions
.
f. Closer and easier freeway access for carriers.
4. Miscellaneous:
a. Possible elimination of the requirement for a GSA
owned assets depot.
b. On site technical assistance from Sharpe\Tracy
personnel during design\construction of new WDC.
c. Access to possible temporary storage, if space should
become a problem.
d. Availability to GSA of "free" land.
e. Quantity discounts for packing\shipping supplies due
to consolidated higher demand.
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f. Possible "loan' of equipment\supplies in emergency
situations
.
g. Consolidation of support services (material handling
equipment repair, maintenance, etc)
.
h. More economic prices on computers\copier
machines \etc.
i. Sharing of infrequently used equipment which might
have to be otherwise rented at considerable cost,
j. Sharing of distribution center assets,
k. Consolidation of janitorial and recycling support.
1. Possible inventory consolidation/reduction.
Although the above items comprise many perceived
opportunities for cost savings and mutual benefits for GSA and
DLA, it should be noted that not all of these benefits may be
achieved due to differences in management, operations,
policies, goals, and politics of the leaders of the separate
organizations
.
As in the previous section of the chapter concerning
costs, many of the benefits presented are hard to quantify
because it is far too early in the proposed project to develop
any true quantitative measurements or identify any true cost
data
.
Additional advantages to DLA/Sharpe, if GSA locates its
Western Distribution Center as proposed, are that it will help
protect them both from any future base closures, help protect
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them from downsizing efforts, and help them obtain the funds
required to operate the base effectively and efficiently.
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IV. CONCERNS REGARDING THE AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES
As we have shown in the last two chapters, GSA and DLA
have basically three options which are viable and worthy of
their consideration for further study. All three of these
options, however, have their own unique set of problems that
could arise depending upon which option is chosen. In this
chapter, we will outline and discuss the known problems and
concerns of each of the three options.
A. REMAIN AT ROUGH AND READY ISLAND
The first option is for GSA to maintain the status quo by
staying at Rough and Ready Island. This option, in the short
run (less than five years) , may be the safest and least costly
for GSA to pursue. However, in the long run, and potentially
even in the short run, this decision probably has the most
problems and raises the most concerns:
1. With the present cut backs in military spending and the
rush to close bases, there is no guarantee that the
communication station at Rough and Ready Island will escape
the axe. If the communications station were to close, then
GSA may find itself without a facility from which to conduct
its operations. The next option available would be for GSA to
either buy the facilities directly, or lease the entire
complex from the Navy.
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2. If GSA were to somehow obtain Rough and Ready Island for
their own use, it still does not solve the problem of the
deterioration of the base infrastructure. It would end up
costing GSA scarce operational and maintenance funds to
upgrade the Island's facilities and buildings. Yet, if GSA is
to remain competitive and keep it's west coast facility off
any near future base closure list, GSA has to improve its cost
effectiveness and efficiency.
3. Should the Navy remain at Rough and Ready Island, GSA is
still left with 1950' s style warehousing, which is in a sad
state of disrepair, and still left without a willing sponsor
to provide the funding required to upgrade the facilities. In
ten years, GSA will be facing the exact same decision they are
facing now, that is whether to re-locate or remain at Rough
and Ready Island. However, in ten years, there may not really
be an option open to GSA other than to re-locate because of
the deterioration of the facilities. At that future point,
all the warehouses will probably be condemned due to lack of




GSA will have to improve its facilities at some point in
time if it is to remain an active participant in the supply
system. In light of past consolidations and the current trend
of support services having to pay for themselves, GSA must
improve its west coast operations or be faced with closure.
Remaining at Rough and Ready Island does not allow GSA to
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remain competitive due to the fact that they are unable to
take advantage of technological advancements made in inventory
control systems. Because of the 1950 r s warehouses and
equipment now employed at Rough and Ready Island, GSA is
unable to stay current with the required throughput of
material necessary to support customer requirements.
Currently, GSA is usually operating at 13-16 days backlog in
requisition completions, even while utilizing a second shift.
5. Rough and Ready Island has only one access road for
trucks, which severely limits the ease of access on and off
the facility for trucking concerns. This causes unacceptable
delays in material handling, both incoming and outbound.
6. GSA does not have direct access to railroad facilities,
shipping ports, or air terminals. This forces GSA to rely on
surface modes of shipments such as UPS, LTL truckers, Federal
Express, etc. By not having access to alternative major modes
of transportation, GSA is probably spending more than it
should for bulk shipments. Also, LTL shipments are more
expensive than FTL shipments which GSA is not able to take
advantage of in all circumstances.
7. Conservative estimates call for approximately another
$500,000 in repairs to the water-main in order for GSA to
increase the water pressure to an acceptable level to
efficiently use their current storage racks.
8. GSA is having difficulty in upgrading their tow-veyor to
an operating condition. The tow-veyor is a rail guided
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material handling cart which greatly increases the throughput
of material. Five years and almost one million dollars have
been invested in this project and it still is not in an
operating condition.
In order for GSA to upgrade Rough and Ready Island into
a modern inventory and warehousing facility, it is estimated
that it would take approximately $8 to $10 million just for
the warehouses and the water-main system. Even after such an
investment in buildings, there is no guarantee that the
facilities could actually be upgraded with modern warehousing
equipment due to the severe problems with the infrastructure
of the Island and the dimensions and layouts of the buildings
themselves. Additionally, the Navy's apparent intent to not
sink any more money into fixing current facility problems
exasperates the above concerns
.
B. BUILD A NEW FACILITY AT SHARPE
Alternative two seems to have the most promise, but still
has some major problems associated with it that must be
resolved. The more significant problems are:
1. The director at WDC really does not want to move from
Rough and Ready Island. It is our opinion that one of the
reasons for this is that, since 80% of GSA business comes from
the military, the next logical step after GSA relocates would
be for DOD to consolidate with GSA and absorb its entire
operation. By maintaining its physical separation from DLA,
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GSA has been able to stay out of the path of Congressional
Staff Committees looking for increased ways to save money
through consolidations.
2. In light of congressional concern over federal agencies
undertaking new construction projects, and in these times of
budget slashing and base closures, new projects are extremely
vulnerable to being rejected. Additionally, concerns from the
Public Building Service (PBS) over the viability of even
having the request forwarded as part of its POM for 1992 must
be considered. PBS prioritizes all new projects and a new GSA
building project may not be high enough on the priority
listing to make it through the first stages, especially if the
Director of WDC is not pushing for its inclusion.
3. The likelihood that an acceptable joint agreement can be
worked out between GSA and DLA is questionable. There is much
to be worked out between these two large organizations if the
entire relocation plan is to work. All support services,
physical distribution responsibilities, security, personnel
situations, and construction requirements must be decided in
advance in order to allow for a smooth transition.
4. Obtaining employee support for the relocation is very
important. GSA must have their employees' support in order
for the move to be successful. Employees will be taking the
brunt of the work load during the relocation phase and they




5. The physical relocation of GSA' s inventory will have to be
accomplished once building of the new facility is complete.
As new orders are received, they will be received at the new
location, but GSA will still have a need to relocate the
remaining inventory and office equipment. This will entail a
period of transition where service and response times will
suffer, the objective during this period is to minimize the
time spent in transition.
Under this alternative, there remain some significant
problems and concerns from both GSA and DLA. However, these
problems are much more solvable than in the first alternative
because they, for the most part, deal with interpersonal
relationships and negotiations rather than infrastructure
(which GSA sees as uneconomical if not impossible to improve)
.
By pursuing the second alternative, GSA is able to control its
own destiny and is not at the mercy of the Navy.
C. LEASE FACILITIES
The third alternative is wrought with the most
significant problems. Not only would GSA have to locate a
complex of warehouses suitable to its needs, but it would then
have to deal almost daily with the owner/manager of the
property (or different properties if separately owned) for
site maintenance, warehouse improvements, access rights,
security, etc., in much the same fashion it must deal with the
Navy now. In our opinion, this alone makes it inconceivable
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as an option for GSA' s consideration. Other major problems
with the leasing of commercial warehouse facilities are the
inherent transportation, receiving, shipping, and inter-
transfer problems that would arise from such an arrangement.
An example of these problems occurred at the site built in New
Jersey. Built a number of years ago under such an agreement,
it has yet to reach full operational capability. In this
option, not only would GSA have to fund the lease of space,
but it might even have to fund the construction of certain
physical facilities (i.e., hazardous materials warehouse) that
would revert to the contractor when the lease expires
.
The next chapter deals with the writers opinions on the




V. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The previous four chapters described the situation in
which GSA finds itself today. GSA has a real need to upgrade
and improve their present position in the inventory and
physical distribution business, especially if they are to stay
competitive. The question is, what approach should GSA
undertake to reach this goal?
There were many different ways and methods to utilize in
arriving at an answer to this primary question. All
approaches may be correct and may have resulted in different
answers depending on the decision makers outlook on the facts
as they are presented. In this presentation, we attempted to
rely on cost/benefit analysis in determining an outcome.
However, we found that at this point in the life of the
project, the cost /benefit analysis may only have provided
marginal effectiveness in arriving at the correct decision,
assuming there is a single "correct" decision in this type of
go\no go situation. We found it necessary to bring into the
picture some of the subjective information that may be
associated with a decision of this magnitude.
Based on our research, we feel that GSA should pursue the
relocating option to Sharpe Army Depot. In this case, the
cost/benefit analysis supports our recommendation, in the long
run. In the short run, it will cost GSA more to pursue this
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alternative, but we feel that in order for GSA to remain a
viable entity in the future they must modernize. Although
budget constraints being what they are obviously have a role
in this matter, GSA should immediately commence to lay the
ground work to relocate its operations to the Sharpe site.
The desirability of GSA remaining at Rough and Ready Island is
questionable, given the conditions of the facilities and
infrastructure. These factors will only continue to
deteriorate and will not improve in the future without an
influx of funding. An example is the tow-veyor system. Over
the last five years, two major contracts worth about $1
million have been exercised, and the equipment is still not
running.
We empathize with the directors concern that GSA may, at
some point, be a candidate for consolidation with other
government activities, but if it results in a more efficient
system, then it should be pursued. We feel there is room for
some real savings under such a joint /tenant agreement between
GSA and DLA , and is, therefore, worthy of further research.
But consolidation is a fact of life in the 1990' s and will
continue to gain momentum as the clamor for decreasing
governmental budgets and downsizing continues. Possibly, the
best approach GSA can take is to be the leader in finding ways
to save dollars through consolidation. Therefore, through




Also, GSA must be concerned with the quality of the
service it provides its customers on a day to day basis.
Currently, GSA is running with a 13 day backlog while
employing two working shifts. There does not appear any way
for GSA to reduce this backlog given the current funding level
and number of employees, which, by the way is decreasing. The
only way for GSA to improve on this is through use of
automation and other labor saving devices. As previously
discussed, neither one of these options is open to GSA at its
present site due to declining maintenance funding and the
expense of upgrading facilities. We feel that GSA owes it to
their customers to relocate and improve the level of service
it provides by taking advantage of modern, state of the art
warehousing equipment and techniques. This backlog will only
worsen as conditions deteriorate further at the present
location. In a new facility, excess capacity can be designed
into the layout in order to absorb business fluctuations and
personnel decreases as the federal government continues to
downsize
.
GSA has a hard decision to make. The conflict to be
resolved is: even if scarce funds were available now, does GSA
want to upgrade their present facilities? Or, does GSA
continue to make do with out-dated facilities knowing that it
will cost much more in the future? Based on the empirical
evidence as presented in the cost/benefit analysis, and based
on the subjective evidence gleaned from personnel interviews
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and referenced material, that GSA should not miss this
opportunity to relocate to Sharpe, build a new facility and
that GSA should begin working towards this goal now.
As for future research areas, numerous studies could be
conducted to support /challenge the above recommendation or to
obtain more specific cost data. A few such studies are:
- determine the actual workload of GSA' s Western
Distribution Center,
- cost/benefit analysis of rail transportation versus
other means of transportation,
- cost/benefit of modernizing/replacing the
infrastructure at Rough and Ready Island, and
- cost/benefit of installing modern warehouse equipment
in the current warehouses at Rough and Ready Island.
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1 . GSA REQUIREMENTS
-1.5 million square feet of useable land
-90-100 acre parcel of land
-access to rail, air services, water transportation, and
surface transportation
-site location within 35 mile radius of current location
in order to alleviate dislocation costs of moving employees
-must be located within one mile of major highways such a
5/99/205/580
-an access road from highway to facility which is able to
accommodate a minimum of 250 passenger vehicles and 100 trucks
per day
General Building Requirements
-back-up power generation capabilities in which to
maintain operation in the event of power failure
-must be fully sprinklered to support stacking to 30 feet
-uninterruptible power source for all computer systems
throughout the center
-must meet seismic requirements
Office Space
-25,000 square feet, multi-level may be considered
-in floor electrical, telephone, and computer cabling
-raised flooring to at least 24 inches
-heating and air conditioning ducting for personal comfort
and computer requirements
-this space to also include specialized areas for cafeteria,
training/conference room, fitness center, shower and bathroom
facilities and childcare center
Special Purpose Space









hazardous materials room 20,000
computer/adp room 2,000
first aid room 300
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janitorial contractor room 500
telenet room 100
laboratory 400






-this space will be located throughout the main warehouse
complex
-must be physically segregated from the storage areas due
to the volatility of the items being stored or the type of
work being performed
-further requirements for each type of space would be
available upon final decisions and would include temperature
controls, special electrical/exhaust/noise reduction
systems/fencing/security etc.
Warehouse Storage
-1,332,200 square feet of open warehouse space under one
roof
-height to permit useable racking and stacking to 30 feet
-floor load requirement is 800 pounds per square foot
-environmentally controlled to reach 65 degrees in winter
and 80 degrees in summer
-8 ground to building access ramps
-100 automatic dock levelers equipped with dock locks and
automatic roll-up or automatic bi-parting doors
-ground level to warehouse truck access
-requires multiple outlets for computer station hookups
and portable computer terminals
-additional specific requirements available upon design of
facility from designers
Outside Space
-440,700 square feet to be used for various functions
-concrete not asphalt
-perimeter must be fenced and lighted with controlled
access through a guard station
-bus stop with covered waiting area near entrance to
offices




employee parking for 250 vehicles 100,000
fuel storage area 10,000
guard shack 200
truck weighing scale 1,800
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railcar weighing scale 5,000
dumpster storage 10,000
high pressure washer area/tank 1,200




-must have industrial medical support personnel available
during working hours and on call
-must include a full equipped dispensary, staffed by a
fully qualified registered nurse
-ambulance and emergency medical technicians within a 15
minute response area from time of emergency call
-food service capabilities such as cafeteria, vending
machines, mobil canteens, etc.
-availability of money access means whether it be check
cashing facility or instant bank machines
Fire and Security Requirements
-must have own fire department on site trained to handle
a variety of fire types including hazardous material type
casualties
-police department must be manned and equipped to operate
base entrance, truck check-in, security patrols, traffic
safety, parking violations, and perimeter control on a 24
hours basis 365 days per year.
The above listed requirements are the minimum acceptable
that GSA has considered this early in the planning process.
This are considerations that must be present before an
alternative will even be considered for further analysis and
consideration.
Although in some cases vague, they are however enough for
GSA to begin preliminary research into alternatives at its
disposal in trying to solve its warehousing situation and its
future into the next century.
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